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NOTES 
THE EXTRATERRITORIAL EFFECT OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE CONTROL LAWS 
Article VIII section 2(b) of the International Monetary Fund Articles of 
Agreem.ent1 makes "exchange contracts" which are contrary to approved 
foreign exchange regulations of members "unenforceable"2 and provides 
that member nations may further agree upon measures to enforce each 
other's foreign exchange laws.3 The recent New York Court of Appeals 
decision in Banco do Brasil, S.A. v. A. C. Israel Commodity Co.4 illustrates 
the serious shortcomings of IMF provisions for enforcing foreign exchange 
controls. The case also suggests that general conflict of laws rules can be used 
to effectuate the policies underlying exchange control laws. 
Before May 1961, Brazilian exchange laws required coffee exporters 
to assign their rights to receive dollar proceeds from export contracts to 
plaintiff bank, an instrumentality of the Brazilian government, which then 
-paid the exporters at 90 cruzeiros per dollar rather than at 220 cruzeiros 
per dollar, the prevailing free market exchange rate.15 Plaintiff bank 
brought suit in New York to recover damages for financial injury allegedly 
caused by a fraudulent scheme to evade the Brazilian exchange regulations. 
The complaint alleged that United States and Brazilian corporations 
knowingly used forged exchange control documents to obtain clearance for 
shipping coffee from Brazil.6 One of these business concerns, a Delaware 
corporation herein called the defendant, allegedly made dollar payments 
for its coffee purchases directly to collaborating Brazilian exporters, who 
l Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, 60 Stat. 1401 (1946) 
(hereinafter cited as IMF Agreement]. 
2 IMF Agreement art. VIII, § 2(b) (hereinafter cited as § 2(b)] provides in its first sen• 
tence: "Exchange contracts which involve the currency of any member and which arc 
contrary to the exchange control regulations of that member maintained or imposed 
consistently with this Agreement shall be unenforceable in the territories of any member." 
60 Stat. 1411 (1946). 
8 The second sentence of § 2(b) provides: "In addition, members may, by mutual 
accord, cooperate in measures for the purpose of making the exchange control regulations 
of either member more effective, provided that such measures and regulations are con• 
sistent with this Agreement." 60 Stat. 1411 (1946). 
4 12 N.Y.2d 371, 190 N.E.2d 235, 239 N.Y.S.2d 872 (1963), cert. denied, 84 S. Ct. 657 
(1964) (hereinafter cited as principal case]. The principal case is noted at 63 CoLUM. L. 
REv. 1334 (1963); 16 STAN. L. REv. 202 (1963); 15 SYRACUSE L. REv. 100 (1963). 
li On May 15, 1961, Brazil revised its exchange control laws. Coffee exporters must 
now deposit a stipulated number of dollars for each bag of coffee exported; they can 
exchange remaining dollar proceeds from the export sale at the free market rate. INT'L 
MONETARY FUND ANN. REP., ExcHANGE REsnuCTIONS 48-51 (1962). Both plaintiff's contract 
with the Brazilian government and Brazilian law authorized plaintiff to bring suit in its 
own name to recover money due Brazil under the exchange control laws. Brief for Ap-
pellant, p. 3, principal case. 
6 The documents by which exporters assigned to plaintiff the foreign currency proceeds 
from export sales were termed "exchange contracts." Defendants' shipping permit forms 
allegedly referred to nonexistent exchange contracts and contained forgeries of plaintiff's 
stamp, signatures of plaintiff's officials, and signatures of United States commercial bank 
officials. Brief for Appellant, p. 5, principal case. 
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exchanged the dollars for cruzeiros at the free market rate. Purchase of 
coffee below market price, the plaintiff asserted, was the benefit achieved 
by the defendant's alleged participation in the scheme. Defendant's motion 
to vacate a warrant of attachment for failure to state a cause of action was 
granted,7 and the Appellate Division affirmed.8 On appeal to the New York 
Court of Appeals, the order was affirmed, three judges dissenting. The 
court ruled that International Monetary Fund membership does not compel 
courts of one member to give effect to another member's foreign exchange 
laws by allowing a suit to be brought for damages for violation of those 
exchange laws. 
Section 2(b) has been a source of frequent controversy,9 and in the 
principal case the plaintiff contended that it requires the courts of one 
member to assist other members in obtaining compliance with their 
exchange controls. The court rejected this contention, relying on three 
different arguments. First, a proposal offered at the Bretton Woods Con-
ference which would have made violation of a member country's foreign 
exchange controls an "offense" outside the territory of that member failed 
of passage.10 Second, the first sentence of section 2(b) merely provides that 
exchange contracts covered by the section are unenforceable in member 
countries.11 This terminology only directs that members deny assistance to 
parties attempting to enforce the proscribed exchange contracts. Accord-
ingly, the IMF's executive directors have interpreted this section to mean 
that members must not lend judicial or executive assistance to parties 
seeking performance of, or damages for the breach of, exchange contracts 
which are unenforceable under section 2(b).12 Third, although the second 
sentence of section 2(b) authorizes member countries to make agreements 
with each other to further effectuate their exchange control regulations,18 
the American Bretton Woods Agreement Act of 194514 enacted into 
7 Banco do Brasil, S.A. v. A.C. Israel Commodity Co., 29 Misc. 2d 229, 215 N.Y.S.2d 3 
(Sup. Ct.), a/fd mem., 13 App. Div. 2d 652, 216 N.Y.S.2d 669 (1961). 
s Ibid. 
9 See generally GoLD, THE FUND AGREEMENT IN THE COURTS (1962). Compare NUSSBAUM, 
MONEY IN THE LAw 540-45 (2d ed. 1950), with Meyer, Recognition of Exchange Controls 
after the International Monetary Fund Agreement, 62 YALE L.J. 867 (1953). 
10 The proposal did not define "offense." 1 PROCEEDINGS AND DOCUMENTS OF THE UNITED 
NATIONS MoNETAllY AND FINANCIAL CONFERENCE 334 (1944) (Dep't State Pub. No. 2866, Int. 
Org. &: Conf. Ser. Nos. 1, 3, 1948). An alternative proposal suggested the use of "unenforce-
able" instead of "offense." Id. at 341. A committee directed that the two proposals be 
reconciled to indicate no intent to impose criminal penalties. Id. at 605. Thereafter the 
proposal to use "unenforceable" was accepted. Id. at 628,671. 
11 Section 2(b); see note 2 supra. For discussions of "exchange contract" and the 
scope of § 2(b), see generally Gold &: Lachman, The Articles of Agreement of the Inter-
national Monetary Fund and the Exchange Control Regulations of Member States, 89 
JOURNAL DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL 666 (1962); Mann, The Private International Law of 
Exchange Control Under the International Monetary Fund Agreement, 2 INT'L &: COMP. 
L.Q. 97 (1953); Meyer, supra note 9, at 885-97. 
12 INT'L MONETARY FUND ANN. REP. 82 (1949), 14 Fed. Reg. 5208-09 (1949). 
13 See note 3 supra. 
u 59 Stat. 512 (1945), 22 U.S.C. § 286 (1958). 
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municipal law only the first sentence of section 2(b).15 Had the second 
sentence also been enacted, domestic courts might have been able to find an 
implied agreement between the federal government and another IMF 
member to effectuate the exchange control laws of that member. No 
implied agreement can properly be found, however, because the second 
sentence of section 2(b) has not been enacted into American municipal 
law. Section 2(b), therefore, does not impose upon courts in the United 
States an affirmative obligation to enforce Brazilian exchange laws.16 
The plaintiff also argued that, apart from section 2(b), United States 
membership in the IMF establishes a federal policy which requires New 
York to recognize those exchange controls of members which are consistent 
with the IMF Agreement. The Department of State and the Department 
of the Treasury, the executive departments charged with negotiation and 
administration of the IMF Agreement, both advised, however, that mere 
acceptance of the IMF Agreement does not establish a federal policy com-
pelling New York to entertain the plaintiff's suit.17 These opinions quite 
likely were the dispositive factors which led the Supreme Court of the 
United States to deny certiorari in the principal case. The Supreme Court 
has indicated that such opinions weigh heavily against finding that the 
United States has an implied obligation under a treaty.18 Moreover, the 
refusal to give effect to Brazilian exchange controls in the principal case 
circumvents only Brazilian regulations, not those of the IMF.19 Finally, no 
express United States obligation under the IMF Agreement would be 
violated by New York's refusal to entertain the suit.20 Therefore, Kolovrat v. 
Oregon21 and United States v. Pink,22 which respectively struck down 
llS 59 Stat. 516 (1945), 22 U.S.C. § 286h (1958). 
16 Accord, NussBAUM, op. cit. supra note 9, at 545; Meyer, supra note 9, at 895; see 
Note, 63 CoLuM. L. REv. 1334, 1339 (1963); Note, 16 STAN. L. R.Ev. 202, 209 (1963). But see 
Note, 15 SYRACUSE L. R.Ev. 100, 102-03 (1963). 
17 Memorandum for the United States, p. 4, principal case. 
18 Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187, 194 (1961); Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 
295 (1933). 
19 Refusal to recognize the Brazilian exchange controls indirectly detracts from the 
IMF's goal of promoting the currency stability and economic development of members. 
Nonetheless, the intricate Brazilian exchange control procedures prevent frequent violation 
of the laws. Furthermore, the International Coffee Agreement of 1962 will make future 
violations of Brazilian exchange controls more difficult because the agreement imposes 
a duty upon importing countries to permit entry of coffee only if prescribed certificates 
are presented. Bilder, The International Coffee Agreement: A Case History in Negotia-
tion, 28 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 328, 361 (1963). 
20 No article in the IMF Agreement obligates courts of one member to give effect to 
other members' exchange controls except in the situation provided for by § 2(b). 
21 366 U.S. 187 (1961). The Court reversed an Oregon Supreme Court ruling that 
denied a Yugoslavian citizen his treaty rights to the property of an Oregon decedent. 
Reciprocity in favor of Oregon heirs was required under Oregon's Iron Curtain Statute. 
The Supreme Court rejected the conclusion of the Oregon courts that reciprocity was 
lacking because Yugoslavia might fail to meet obligations expressly placed on it by the 
IMF Agreement. 
22 315 U.S. 203 (1942). A United States foreign policy expressed in connection with 
an executive agreement required recognition of Russian nationalization decrees. New 
York law prohibited local recognition of the decrees. The Court gave effect to the federal 
1964] NOTES 1235 
state laws that blocked fulfillment of obligations of the United States under 
a treaty and an executive agreement, could not support the plaintiff's 
argument.23 
It must therefore be conceded that the New York courts were not 
obligated to entertain the action in the principal case. Neither the fact 
that section 2(b) is inapplicable to suits of this kind nor the lack of a 
federal policy requiring domestic courts to entertain such suits, however, 
precludes the presentation of an enforceable claim. In the principal case, 
for instance, the New York courts could have entertained the cause of 
action since the complaint stated facts establishing a tort claim for damages 
based on fraudulent evasion of Brazilian exchange controls.24 Emphasizing 
that defendant's acts allegedly in furtherance of the plan to defraud the 
plaintiff all occurred in New York,25 the Court of Appeals stated that 
under New York law it is not a tort for an individual to enter into a con-
tract which violates the exchange controls of an IMF member.26 It is 
apparent, therefore, that the Court of Appeals consulted New York sub-
stantive law to determine whether the alleged facts were sufficient to state 
a cause of action.27 Because significant aspects of the conduct complained of 
did occur in Brazil, the court should have examined relevant conflict of 
laws rules to determine whether New York or Brazilian law governed the 
plaintiff's tort claim. 
The traditional conflict of laws rule for tort suits is that the substantive 
law of the place of the injury determines the rights and liabilities of the 
parties.28 Under this rule Brazilian law would clearly be applicable to the 
principal case because both the false representation and the injury occurred 
in Brazil. Shortly after the decision in the principal case, however, New 
York rejected the "place of injury" test, and it now determines the rights 
and duties of parties to a tort suit by applying the law of the state with 
the most significant relationship to the transaction.29 Under the American 
policy established by the executive agreement over the conflicting state laws. See generally 
Cardozo, The Authority in Internal Law of International Treaties: The Pink Case, 13 
SYRACUSE L. REv. 544 (1962); Note, United States v. Pink-A Reappraisal, 48 CoLUM. L. 
R.Ev. 890 (1948). 
23 But cf. 63 CoLUM. L. REv. 1334, 1340-41 (1963). 
24 Principal case at 378, 190 N.E.2d at 238,239 N.Y.S.2d at 876. 
25 Id. at 376, 190 N.E.2d at 237, 239 N.Y.S.2d at 875. Also, defendant's principal place 
of business was in New York. Ibid. 
26 Id. at 376-77, 190 N.E.2d at 237,239 N.Y.S.2d at 875. 
27 In giving a negative answer to the certified question of whether plaintiff had alleged 
facts sufficient to state a cause of action, the court parenthetically indicated that New 
York law was the law of the transaction. Ibid. This puzzling reference fails to indicate 
whether the court was applying New York law to the coffee sale contrat:t, the alleged 
tort claim, or both the coffee sale contract and the tort claim. 
28 E.g., Sanders v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 204 F.2d 436 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 916 
(1953); Poplar v. Bourjois, Inc., 298 N.Y. 62, 80 N.E.2d 334 (1948); Kerfoot v. Kelley, 294 
N.Y. 288, 62 N.E.2d 74 (1945); Tumowski v. Tumowski, 33 Misc. 2d 864, 226 N.Y.S.2d 
738 (Sup. Ct. 1962); GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAws 260 (3d ed. 1949); REsrATEMENT, CON-
FLICT OF LAws § 379 (1934). 
20 Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963). The 
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Law Institute's formulation of this new rule, although all relevant factors 
and policies must be weighed, the place of injury, the place where the 
wrongful conduct was committed, and the domiciles of the parties are of 
particular importance.3° Furthermore, in propounding its new rule the 
New York Court of Appeals said that in most instances the law of the place 
of injury will still control because of that jurisdiction's interest in regulat-
ing conduct within its borders.31 In the principal case both the allegedly 
fraudulent acts and the injury complained of occurred in Brazil, which was 
also the plaintiff's domicile. Brazil clearly has an interest in regulating 
fraudulent conduct within its borders; competing New York interests are 
not apparent. Thus, even under the new "significant contacts" test, 
Brazilian law should have been applied to determine whether the plaintiff 
alleged sufficient facts to state a cause of action.32 
Article 159 of the Brazilian Codigo Civil obligates one who intentionally 
violates the rights of another to compensate the injured person for damages 
incurred.33 A right of the plaintiff was clearly in issue in the principal case 
because Brazilian exchange controls imposed a duty to pay proceeds from 
coffee exports to the plaintiff,34 and the plaintiff was authorized to sue to 
recover money due it under the exchange controls.811 The alleged concerted 
action by the defendants to evade the exchange control laws probably 
violated the plaintiff's right to receive foreign currency and therefore 
obligated the defendants to compensate the plaintiff for the injury. Thus, 
under Brazilian law a civil wrong may well have been committed. The law 
which conflict of laws rules indicate is applicable to a tort suit also deter-
mines whether an individual is liable as a joint tort-feasor36 and establishes 
New York rule follows REsTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAws § 379 (I'ent. Draft No. 
8, 1963). See Cavers, Cheatham, Currie, Ehrenzweig, Leflar &: Reese, Comments on Babcock 
v. Jackson, a Recent Development in Conflict of Laws, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 1212 (1963). 
Currie asserts that New York has actually gone beyond the "most significant rclationshipn 
test, and that the policies and interests of the states involved, rather than particular 
contacts, will determine the choice of law. Id. at 1235. But see EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF 
LAws § 122 (1962). 
30 REsTATEMENT (SECOND), op. cit. supra note 29, § 379(2). 
31 Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473,483, 191 N.E.2d 279,284,240 N.Y.S.2d 743, 750-51 
(1963). 
32 See REsTATEMENT (SECOND), op. cit. supra note 29, § 379c: "Fraud and Misrepresenta-
tion. (1) When the plaintiff has suffered pecuniary harm on account of his reliance on 
the defendant's false representations and when the plaintiff's action in reliance took place 
in the state where the false representations were made and received, the local law of 
this state determines, almost invariably, the plaintiff's rights in tort against the defendant." 
See, e.g., James-Dickinson Farm Mortgage Co. v. Harry, 273 U.S. 119, 126 (1927); Texas 
Tunneling Co. v. City of Chattanooga, 204 F. Supp. 821, 827 (E.D. Tenn. 1962); Israel v. 
Alexander, 50, F. Supp. 1007, 1009 (S.D.N.Y. 1942). But see EHRENZWEIG, op. cit. supra 
note 29, § 215(3). 
33 CoDIGO CIVIL art. 159 (Brazil 1961); see 1 BEVILAQUA, CODIGO CIVIL 448-50 (1951). 
34 See !NT'L MONETARY FUND ANN. REP., EXCHANGE REsTRICTIONS 48 (1962). Brazilian 
law would determine whether the plaintiff's right is legally protected. See REsTATEMENT 
(SECOND), op. cit. supra note 28, § 380a. 
35 See note 5 supra. 
36 REsTATEMENT (SECOND), op. cit. supra note 29, § 390c; see Mosby v. Manhattan Oil 
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the measure of damages.37 The Brazilian Codigo Civil specifies that both 
the wrongdoers and those who participate in committing the wrong are 
jointly liable for the damage caused.38 Thus, under Brazilian law, proof of 
the plaintiff's allegations that defendant knew of the plan to evade the 
exchange controls, participated in the plan, and benefited by its participa-
tion, would impose joint liability on the defendant to pay damages even 
though its acts occurred only in New York. Although courts have been 
reluctant to enforce tort liability imposed by the law of a foreign jurisdic-
tion when the defendant was neither present in the foreign state nor a 
participant in the tortious conduct,89 courts have enforced tort liability 
imposed by foreign law when the defendant, though not present in the 
foreign state, was sufficiently closely connected with the wrong committed 
there:10 The alleged intentional participation in and benefit from the wrong 
committed in Brazil would sufficiently relate the defendant in the principal 
case to the place where the wrong was committed to warrant enforcement 
by a New York court of liability created by Brazilian law. Under the 
Brazilian law, the plaintiff did allege facts sufficient to state a cause of 
action. Furthermore, in similar cases, whether the forum follows the 
traditional place-of-wrong test or the new "significant relationship" test, 
foreign law will be applicable and, in most instances, will make the conduct 
actionable. Thus there will usually be a sound basis for providing relief, 
unless some other conflict of laws rule prohibits application of the relevant 
foreign law in the forum court. 
In the principal case the court held that no effect could be given to the 
Brazilian exchange controls because a conflict of laws rule barred enforce-
ment of the revenue laws of a foreign sovereign.41 However widely this 
Co., 52 F.2d 364 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 284 U.S. 677 (1931); Bache v. Dixie-Ohio Express 
Co., 8 F.R.D. 159 (N.D. Ga. 1948). 
37 E.g., Wynne v. McCarthy, 97 F.2d 964 (10th Cir. 1938); Rauton v. Pullman Co., 183 
S.C. 495, 191 S.E. 416 (1937); Davis v. Gant, 247 S.W. 576, 580 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923); 2 
RABEL, THE CONFLICT OF LAws 276-80 (2d ed. 1960); REsrATEMENT (SECOND), op. cit. supra 
note 29, § 390b. 
38 CoDIGO CIVIL art. 1518 (Brazil 1961); see 5 BEVILAQUA, op. cit. supra note 33, at 
290-94. 
30 A husband who has never been to Florida and who did not participate in the 
wrong can not be held liable in New York for his wife's tort committed in Florida even 
though Florida imposed liability on husbands for their wives' torts. Siegmann v. Meyer, 
100 F.2d 367 (2d Cir. 1938). 
4.0 Fischl v. Chubb, 30 Pa. D. & C. 40 (C.P. 1937), 51 HAn.v. L. REv. 738 (1938); see 
Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280 (1952); Le Forest v. Tolman, II7 Mass. 109 (1875); 
cf. Brackett v. Griswold, ll2 N.Y. 454, 20 N.E. 376 (1889); Continental Confections v. S & 
M Sugar Co., 20 Misc. 2d 914, 194 N.Y.S.2d 178 (Sup. Ct. 1959). 
41 Principal case at 377, 190 N.E.2d at 237, 239 N.Y.S.2d at 875. This rule was intro-
duced into international law by dicta of Lord Mansfield in two King's Bench cases. 
Planche v. Fletcher, l Doug!. 251, 253, 99 Eng. Rep. 164, 165 (K.B. 1779); Holman v. 
Johnson, l Cowp. 341, 343, 98 Eng. Rep. ll20, ll21 (K.B. 1775). 
Learned Hand once argued that courts ought not to act on claims arising from for• 
eign revenue laws because such laws involve relations between states; a judicial decision 
might conflict with executive policies on foreign affairs or embarrass the foreign govern-
ment which brings the suit. Moore v. Mitchell, 30 F.2d 600, 604 (2d Cir. 1929) (concurring 
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rule may be followed,42 it was inapplicable to the principal case for two 
reasons. First, as the dissent observed/8 suit was not brought to implement 
Brazilian regulatory law, but to recover damages for fraud.44 Second, the 
Brazilian exchange controls are not revenue laws. Recent authorities deny 
that exchange controls, particularly those consistent with the IMF Agree-
ment, are foreign revenue laws within the meaning of the non-enforcement 
rule.45 No significant authority supports the proposition that foreign 
exchange controls are revenue laws.46 The Brazilian government does raise 
revenue from coffee exports; such revenue, however, is utilized in enforcing 
comprehensive controls on exports, imports, and financial transactions. 
The primary purposes of the exchange controls are to stabilize Brazilian 
currency, to supply vital foreign currency for payment of international trade 
obligations, and to promote planned economic development in Brazil.47 
opinion), afj'd on other grounds, 281 U.S. 18 (1930). This abstention doctrine has not 
been applied to prior cases involving foreign exchange controls; furthermore, New York 
courts have frequently decided on the merits cases involving foreign exchange controls. Be-
cause application of Hand's abstention doctrine would block all suits for the recovery of 
damages by a foreign sovereign, the consequent harm to foreign relations would probably 
exceed that caused by an adverse decision on the merits. Contra, 16 STAN. L. REv. 202, 
206-07 (1963). 
42 Matter of Matthews' Trust, 21 Misc. 2d 356, 191 N.Y.S.2d 994 (Sup. Ct. 1959); In re 
Estate of McNeel, 10 Misc. 2d 359, 170 N.Y.S.2d 893 (Surr. Ct. 1957); United States v. 
Harden, (1963] Can. Sup. Ct. 366, 41 D.L.R.2d 721 (1963); Government of India v. Taylor, 
(1955] A.C. 491; GOODRICH, op. cit. supra note 28, at 27; 1 OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL 
LAw § 144a (8th ed. Lauterpacht 1955). 
43 Principal case at 378, 190 N.E.2d at 238, 239 N.Y.S.2d at 876. 
44 In spite of the fact that recovery in the principal case would arguably implement 
Brazilian law indirectly, the defendants' allegedly tortious conduct would itself seem to 
justify recovery if proved. 
45 In re Helbert Wagg 8: Co., (1956] Ch. 323, 351 (by implication); Zivnostenska 
Banka Nat'! Corp. v. Frankman, (1950] A.C. 57, 72; Kahler v. Midland Bank, (1950] A.C. 24, 
57 (1949) (dictum); GRAVESON, THE CONFLICT OF LAws 573-74 (4th ed. 1960); Cabot, Ex-
change Control and the Conflict of Laws: An Unsolved Puzzle, 99 U. PA. L. REv. 476, 489 
(1951); Freutel, Exchange Control, Freezing Orders and the Conflict of Laws, 56 HARV. L. 
REV. 30, 45-46 (1942); Meyer, supra note 9, at 877; Note, Foreign Revenue Laws and the 
English Conflict of Laws, 3 INT'L 8: COMP. L.Q. 465, 466-67 (1954). 
46 Although recognition of a Portuguese law prohibiting the exportation of gold was 
refused in Boucher v. Lawson, Cas. t. Hard. 85, 95 Eng. Rep. 53 (K.B. 1734), the opinion 
suggests that Lord Hardwicke would not have recognized any Portuguese law. Cermak v. 
Bata Akciova Spolecnost, 80 N.Y.S.2d 782 (Sup. Ct. 1948), afj'd mem., 275 App. Div. 919, 90 
N.Y.S.2d 680 (1949), and Matter of Theresie Liebl, 201 Misc. 1102, 106 N.Y.S.2d 715 (Surr. 
Ct. 1951), are sometimes said to hold that exchange control laws are revenue laws. In 
Cermak, however, the court held that because a license to make the assignments sued on 
had been issued in accordance with the Czechoslovakian exchange control laws, the license 
requirement was not a defense. The dictum implication that exchange control laws are 
foreign revenue laws seems no more than an afterthought. Although in Liebl, Czech-
oslovakian exchange control laws were described as fiscal and therefore unenforceable, 
the case can be viewed as based on the alternative holding that the New York public 
policy favoring protection of domestic distributee's interests in a decedent's property 
which is situated in New York precluded recognition of the foreign exchange laws. The 
confiscatory character of the Czechoslovakian exchange controls may have prompted the 
court to call them unenforceable. 
47 See Mattera, Foreign Exchange Budgets in Latin America, 4 INT'L MONETARY FUND 
STAFF PAPERS 288 (1955). See generally Fleming, Developments in the International Pay• 
ments System, 10 INT'L MONETARY FUND STAFF PAPERS 461 (1963). 
1964] NOTES 1239 
The operations and purposes of the exchange controls extend far beyond 
those of domestic tax laws.48 Thus the rule prohibiting enforcement of 
foreign revenue laws was improperly applied in the principal case, and 
would probably be equally inapplicable in similar cases. 
Two other conflict of laws rules conceivably might be invoked by a 
court in order to bar reference to foreign exchange laws. The first rule is 
that courts of one country do not give effect to foreign penal Iaws.49 This 
rule applies not only to prosecutions and sentences for crimes and mis-
demeanors, but to all suits in favor of a sovereign for the recovery of 
pecuniary penalties for any violation of statutes for the protection of its 
revenue or other municipal laws, as well as to suits based on judgments for 
such penalties.50 The nature of foreign penal laws and claims has never 
·been precisely delineated. Many foreign governmental claims are not 
barred by the penal law doctrine.51 Recognizing the right of every foreign 
government to protect its economy by foreign exchange controls, a well-
reasoned case recently held that foreign exchange laws are neither penal 
nor confiscatory.52 Numerous other authorities agree that foreign exchange 
regulations are not penal laws.53 In the principal case, for example, the 
plaintiff sought neither a statutory pecuniary penalty nor exemplary 
damages. Rather, the plaintiff sought damages to compensate it for the 
deprivation of foreign currency caused by the defendants' allegedly wrong-
ful conduct.54 The rule denying enforcement to penal laws or claims was 
therefore inapposite. 
48 Details of Brazil's extensive exchange control system are digested in INT'L MONETARY 
FUND ANN. REP., EXCHA.NGE RE.snuCTIONS 52-59 (1961); id. at 44-55 (1962); id. at 43-53 
(1963). The foreign revenue rule seems to have been applied only to suits for foreign tax 
claims or judgments. Freutel, supra note 45, at 45-46, 46 n.65. 
411 See generally GOODRICH, op. cit. supra note 28, § 12; GRAVESoN, op. cit. supra note 
45, at 572; R.EsTATEMENT, op. cit. supra note 28, § 611. 
50 Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265, 290 (1888). Further discussion of laws 
penal within the scope of the nonenforcement rule appears in Huntington v. Attrill, 146 
U.S. 657, 666-74 (1892). 
51 The Sapphire, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 164 (1871) (damages awarded to French govern-
ment for collision injury to its ship); Lehigh Valley R.R. v. State of Russia, 21 F.2d 396 
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 275 U.S. 571 (1927); Connolly v. Bell, 286 App. Div. 220, 141 
N.Y.S.2d 753 (1955), modified, 309 N.Y. 581, 132 N.E.2d 852 (1956); Wisconsin v. Pelican 
Ins. Co., supra note 50, at 290 (strictly civil claims of a foreign state said to be not penal) 
(dictum); R.EsTATEMENT, op. cit. supra note 28, § 610, comment f (proprietary claims of 
foreign state allowed). A New Jersey money judgment rendered in a suit brought by the 
state to rescind a contract was held entitled to full faith and credit in New York. "[W]e 
must keep in mind that here the state was in effect a private suitor seeking a private 
remedy to vindicate its proprietary interests. The mere fact that a sovereign state was the 
litigant is not controlling ..•• Such a recovery is not to be refused full faith and credit 
on the theory that the judgment was penal." Connolly v. Bell, supra at 230, 141 N.Y.S.2d 
at 764. 
52 In re Helbert Wagg &: Co., (1956] Ch. 323, 349-51. 
53 Etier v. Kertesz, [1960] Ont. 672, 688; Kahler v. Midland Bank, (1950] A.C. 24, 57 
(1949); Zivnostenska Banka Nat'l Corp. v. Frankman, (1950] A.C. 57, 72; Cabot, supra 
note 45, at 489; Freutel, supra note 45, at 46; Meyer, supra note 9, at 877. 
li4 Plaintiff sought damages measured by the difference between the price for the 
American dollars in the Brazilian free market and the lesser amount it would have paid 
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Another relevant conflict of laws rule bars recognition or enforcement 
of foreign laws which conflict wth the public policy of the forum.55 "Public 
policy" is an ambiguous and nebulous term, but it has been defined to 
refer to established principles of law, whether found in the constitution, in 
statutes, or in judicial decisions.56 Proof of the Brazilian exchange controls 
in order to assess damages in the principal case would not have offended 
provisions of the New York Constitution or statutes.57 New York's judicial 
decisions disclose an occasional recognition of foreign exchange controls,58 
but more frequent refusal to recognize them.59 Where recognition has been 
refused, however, it was because of some specific feature of the particular 
the exporter for the American dollars had they been deposited with plaintiff bank as 
requfred by law. 
55 See generally GooDRICH, op. cit. supra note 28, § 11; REsTATEMENT, op. cit. supra 
not~ 28, § 612. Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187 (1961), and Perutz v. Bohemian Discount 
Bank, 304 N.Y. 533, 110 N.E.2d 6 (1953), contain language which suggests that United 
States membership in the IMF prevents domestic courts from finding that another member's 
exchange controls violate the forum's public policy. See GoLD, op. cit. supra note 9, at 
52, 134. Art. VIII § 2(b) precludes members from denying effect to exchange regulations 
of other members on the basis of public policy in situations covered by § 2(b). INT'L 
MONETARY FUND ANN. REP. 83 (1949). The IMF's executive directors have also expressed 
willingness to rule on whether the exchange controls of a member arc consistent with the 
IMF Agreement. Ibid. IMF rulings on the compliance of a member's exchange controls 
with the IMF Agreement are available to litigants in private suits. See GoLD, op. cit. supra 
note 9, at 99-100. 
56 Mertz v. Mertz, 271 N.Y. 466, 472, 3 N.E.2d 597, 599 (1936); People v. Hawkins, 157 
N.Y. 1, 12, 51 N.E. 257, 260 (1898). "Public policy," a troublesome concept, has been 
differently defined and has served different functions in conflict of laws situations. See 
generally Paulson &: Sovern, "Public Policy" in the Conflict of Laws, 56 CoLUM. L. REV. 
969 (1956). 
57 Neither the Court of Appeals nor the trial court referred to any constitutional or 
statutory provisions which would bar reference to the Brazilian laws. A further search 
has not revealed provisions with which the Brazilian law would conflicL 
58 Perutz v. Bohemian Discount Bank, 304 N.Y. 533, 110 N.E.2d 6 (1953); Anderson v. 
N.V. Transandine Handelmaatschappij, 289 N.Y. 9, 43 N.E.2d 502 (1942); Kraus v. 
Zivnostenska Banka, 187 Misc. 681, 64 N.Y.S.2d 208 (Sup. CL 1946); Steinfink v. North 
German Lloyd S.S. Co., 176 Misc. 413, 27 N.Y.S.2d 918 (Sup. CL 1941). Foreign courts 
have given wider recognition to exchange controls since the creation of the IMF. See 
generally GoLD, op. cit. supra note 9. 
59 E.g., Southwestern Shipping Corp. v. First Nat'! City Bank, 6 N.Y.2d 454, 160 
N.E.2d 836, 190 N.Y.S.2d 352, cert. denied, 361 U.S. 895 (1959) (conflict with New York 
agency law prevented recognition); Bollack v. Societe Generale, 263 App. Div. 601, !l!I 
N.Y.S.2d 986, leave to appeal denied, 264 App. Div. 767, 35 N.Y.S.2d 717 (1942) (con-
fiscatory exchange control held unenforceable); Matter of Theresie Liebl, 201 Misc. 1102, 
106 N.Y.S.2d 715 (Surr. Ct. 1951) (exchange control which conflicted with the interests of 
domestic distributees of decedent's New York property held unenforceable) (alternative 
holding); see Meyer, supra note 9, at 876-78. See generally Rashba, Foreign Exchange 
Restrictions and Public Policy in the Conflict of Laws (pts. 1-2), 41 MICH. L. REv. 777, 
1089 (1943). 
Although the Brazilian exporters were required to assign a stipulated number of 
dollars to the plaintiff for each bag of coffee exported, it is improper to call the Brazilian 
exchange controls confiscatory. The Brazilian government does not appropriate the entire 
proceeds. Also, New York coffee importers pay for the right to import coffee from Brazil; 
that some of their payment goes to the Brazilian government to operate the exchange con-
trol system does not justify the conclusion that their property is confiscated or that the 
exchange controls are confiscatory. 
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exchange control. No apparent characteristics of the Brazilian exchange 
controls would have caused recognition of them in the principal case to 
"violate some prevalent conception of good morals, some deep-rooted 
tradition of the common-weal."60 New York public policy, therefore, did 
not block reference to the Brazilian exchange controls in the principal 
case, and a similar resolution of this issue should be expected in other 
jurisdictions. 
Although no federal obligation or policy required New York to enter-
tain the suit in the principal case, a reasonable reading of New York 
conflict of laws rules indicates that the Court of Appeals deviated from 
established principles in affirming the dismissal of the principal case. 
In addition, the United States, through its treaties, the Alliance for 
Progress, and membership in the IMF, is deeply committed to fostering 
financial stability and economic development in Brazil.61 The decision in 
the principal case, if followed by other state courts, will have the unfortu-
nate effect of denying IMF members the right to seek compensation in 
American courts for acts which undermine their financial stability and 
economic development. In order effectively to enforce the strong com-
mitments of the United States to the stability and development of IMF 
members, state courts must be willing to undertake a more imaginative 
and constructive approach than was followed in the principal case. Short 
of this, however, adequate enforcement may now be possible only if the 
second sentence of section 2(b) is enacted and formal agreements to 
effectuate members' exchange control laws are consummated. 
F. David Trickey 
60 Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N.Y. 99, 111, 120 N.E. 198, 202 (1918) (Cardozo, J.) 
(dictum). 
61 E.g., 59 Stat. 517 (1945), 22 U.S.C. § 286k (1958); Agreement with the Government 
of the United States of Brazil on the Cooperation of the Government of the United 
States of America for the Promotion of Economic and Social Development in the Bra-
zilian Northeast, April 13, 1962, [1962] 1 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 356, T.I.A.S. No. 4990; Agree-
ment with Brazil Respecting Mobilization of the Productive Resources of Brazil, March 
3, 1942, 57 Stat. 1314, E.A.S. No. 370. 
